Some good ideas here, Judd. From my perspective, two of the best are "shorter statements strategically timed throughout the entire election cycle" and "when we issue a statement, we should preview what we intend to do next." The former because we leave so much leverage on the floor (to egregiously mix metaphors) when we use statements as grades after the fact rather than instruments to shape behavior in the near term; the latter because we lose even more when we grade and then drop until the next election cycle.
I found this really interesting! You visited my class in Fall 2022 and I asked you about the tension between democratic values and US interests in our relationships with African governments. It is interesting to read your reflections on these similar questions now that you are out of government. One country I brought up at the time was Niger, and you specifically took exception with it and argued it was making strong democratic progress. The 2023 coup (and public support for it) seems to indicate that many people in Niger were unsatisfied with such supposed progress (or the institutional progress was not translating to their lived realities). I’d be curious on your reflections on why the USG can sometimes miss these warning signs by focusing on the wrong metrics (eg. election credibility over public service delivery)
So much to say — but I’ll save it for a future post on coups. By the way, I think a country can make progress on democracy and at the same time be vulnerable to a coup. The risk of backsliding is highest in the decade or so following a transition. (By the way, most coups are not rejected by publics. Sudan 2021, Sierra Leone in 1997, and Nigeria 1994 are exceptions.)
Some thoughtful points here, but it feels too much like an apology for Sec. Rubio's recent evisceration of the State Department's annual Human Rights Report, which once had perhaps more integrity than the election statements. Many African elections have been shams in recent years, including Chad's, Angola's, and Burundi's; many others have been flawed, including Nigeria's, DRC's and Sierra Leone's; but some have also been praiseworthy, such as Liberia's, Senegal's, and South Africa's. Surely it is possible for the US government, in keeping with our national values, to register condemnation of elections that have been stolen, suggest improvement for those that were lacking, and endorse those that are good examples. Better yet, provide more support to domestic electoral monitoring groups that have credibility and a stake in their country's democracy. Otherwise, I fear American hypocrisy will become simply shameless: we stand by the dictators and tyrants that serve our interests and abandon African citizens yearning for basic human rights and freedom.
Some good ideas here, Judd. From my perspective, two of the best are "shorter statements strategically timed throughout the entire election cycle" and "when we issue a statement, we should preview what we intend to do next." The former because we leave so much leverage on the floor (to egregiously mix metaphors) when we use statements as grades after the fact rather than instruments to shape behavior in the near term; the latter because we lose even more when we grade and then drop until the next election cycle.
Thanks Denis. It is hugely validating coming from you — an expert who has taught me so much about democratization and political stability.
I found this really interesting! You visited my class in Fall 2022 and I asked you about the tension between democratic values and US interests in our relationships with African governments. It is interesting to read your reflections on these similar questions now that you are out of government. One country I brought up at the time was Niger, and you specifically took exception with it and argued it was making strong democratic progress. The 2023 coup (and public support for it) seems to indicate that many people in Niger were unsatisfied with such supposed progress (or the institutional progress was not translating to their lived realities). I’d be curious on your reflections on why the USG can sometimes miss these warning signs by focusing on the wrong metrics (eg. election credibility over public service delivery)
So much to say — but I’ll save it for a future post on coups. By the way, I think a country can make progress on democracy and at the same time be vulnerable to a coup. The risk of backsliding is highest in the decade or so following a transition. (By the way, most coups are not rejected by publics. Sudan 2021, Sierra Leone in 1997, and Nigeria 1994 are exceptions.)
Now it's confirmed that You view Africa as your fiefdom!
Some thoughtful points here, but it feels too much like an apology for Sec. Rubio's recent evisceration of the State Department's annual Human Rights Report, which once had perhaps more integrity than the election statements. Many African elections have been shams in recent years, including Chad's, Angola's, and Burundi's; many others have been flawed, including Nigeria's, DRC's and Sierra Leone's; but some have also been praiseworthy, such as Liberia's, Senegal's, and South Africa's. Surely it is possible for the US government, in keeping with our national values, to register condemnation of elections that have been stolen, suggest improvement for those that were lacking, and endorse those that are good examples. Better yet, provide more support to domestic electoral monitoring groups that have credibility and a stake in their country's democracy. Otherwise, I fear American hypocrisy will become simply shameless: we stand by the dictators and tyrants that serve our interests and abandon African citizens yearning for basic human rights and freedom.