My direct field experience with Special Envoys (Feingold and Perriello) was when I was USAID MD in DRC (2011-2016) and it colored my views later when I was back in DC working with them. In addition to the factors you mentioned, the negative impact on the influence of bilateral ambassadors at the highest levels in their countries of having Special Envoys should be considered. There are times when it might be better to let our seasoned ambassadors work on some of the difficult or intractable problems jointly rather than assume some outsider coming in can wave a magic wand and solve the problem. Princeton Lyman and Holbrook were of a different ilk. That said, I was grateful that Feingold got DRC a $30 million supplemental almost all of which went to some great development activities!
Should there be a de facto (or de jure... is there a Congressional role here?) understanding that envoys can't be created unless they report to the president or the secretary... and/or that they have discrete, non overlapping responsibilities with regional folks? Just strikes me that, of your examples and those from my own (much more limited) experience, the more "successful" ones had discrete responsibilities, not broad regional (eg Horn of Africa) responsibilities. The others (resourcing/staffing, relationships/ability to work the interagency) are obviously of critical importance but are also common across government... Defining (narrowly if necessary) the focus/intended outcomes seems like something we can/should be able to fix.
As of Jan 23, special envoys are also supposed to be Senate confirmed or be limited to 12 months in their job (180 days without confirmation plus 180 days with a waiver).
In practice, the Biden admin exercised the waiver authority for its Mid East Humanitarian envoy then appointed a new person to the role after Satterfield’s term was up. The discontinuity in the middle of a war was challenging to say the least
Interesting article, Judd. It provided me with some new material to think about.
Regards
My direct field experience with Special Envoys (Feingold and Perriello) was when I was USAID MD in DRC (2011-2016) and it colored my views later when I was back in DC working with them. In addition to the factors you mentioned, the negative impact on the influence of bilateral ambassadors at the highest levels in their countries of having Special Envoys should be considered. There are times when it might be better to let our seasoned ambassadors work on some of the difficult or intractable problems jointly rather than assume some outsider coming in can wave a magic wand and solve the problem. Princeton Lyman and Holbrook were of a different ilk. That said, I was grateful that Feingold got DRC a $30 million supplemental almost all of which went to some great development activities!
Should there be a de facto (or de jure... is there a Congressional role here?) understanding that envoys can't be created unless they report to the president or the secretary... and/or that they have discrete, non overlapping responsibilities with regional folks? Just strikes me that, of your examples and those from my own (much more limited) experience, the more "successful" ones had discrete responsibilities, not broad regional (eg Horn of Africa) responsibilities. The others (resourcing/staffing, relationships/ability to work the interagency) are obviously of critical importance but are also common across government... Defining (narrowly if necessary) the focus/intended outcomes seems like something we can/should be able to fix.
There actually is. That doesn’t really solve the problem.
Sigh.
As of Jan 23, special envoys are also supposed to be Senate confirmed or be limited to 12 months in their job (180 days without confirmation plus 180 days with a waiver).
In practice, the Biden admin exercised the waiver authority for its Mid East Humanitarian envoy then appointed a new person to the role after Satterfield’s term was up. The discontinuity in the middle of a war was challenging to say the least