Thought-provoking post, Judd. From a European perspective, you are half right. Aid policy has moved in cycles. There was a 15-year cycle (2000-2015) during which UK and European aid was deliberately channelled through African governments as budget support with as little conditionality on how it was used except at the macro-level on both governance and economic policy. It supported states; it provided leverage; it delivered results. But it did not last. Why that was so deserves a longer article, which is important to answer the question, what aid, if any, is still needed.
As someone who has worked for USAID for the past 19 years, I found this to be an interesting and thoughtful piece. However, I was struck by the absence of any reference to the role Congress played in the shift of foreign assistance. Almost 98% of USAID's budget was earmarked by Congress, which meant that even when the Administration directives and/or realities on the ground did not match the programming/funding, there was little the Agency could do to adjust direction. If you are planning to do another piece, I would strongly encourage you to delve into Congress' role in US foreign assistance.
In all the debate about Trump destroying foreign aid, discussion on "the future of aid" and critiques of status quo ante, Congress and the law is totally absent? If aid was misbegotten, ineffectual, bureaucratic, etc etc most of the blame should lie with Congress and existing law which highly constrained aid agencies and practitioners. Trump, for better or worse, has chosen to completely ignore the law - which is an innovation I wish Democrats and Republicans had grasped long ago to improve (rather than destroy) aid. Apparently the Supreme Court doesn't care at all, so this was available to us all along.
At the time of the GAO audit of USAID’s government to government program, Usaid had given over $620 million directly to governments who met financial and anti corruption criteria. The GAO found that risk assessments of these bilateral financial arrangements needed to be strengthened. Much more is available here in the report, but at the least it should be acknowledged that Usaid was doing bilateral assistance, it was trying to do it with criteria and we should analyze the challenges it had and the findings of assessing it before the next model completely pivots to writing checks. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-377.pdf
Nicole: the report says that between 2010 and 2014, G2G funding declined from about $929 million to $327 million.
Of the $327 million, 76 percent went to Pakistan and Afghanistan. That's a small pittance for the rest of the world, and I suspect just a fraction for Africa.
Great review, Judd! I see this was published a day before Doge alum-now State Department appointee Jeremy Lewin's New York Times interview on foreign aid. He talked about the current administration's vision for foreign assistance and specifically highlighted more government-to-government engagement, as you described. It reinforces (for me at least) that facts, patterns and common sense ideas still exist outside of the extreme division that permeates today's political discourse in the U.S, thankfully....looking forward to reading more!
At the time of the GAO audit of USAID’s government to government program, Usaid had given over $620 million directly to governments who met financial and anti corruption criteria. The GAO found that risk assessments of these bilateral financial arrangements needed to be strengthened. Much more is available here in the report, but at the least it should be acknowledged that Usaid was doing bilateral assistance, it was trying to do it with criteria and we should analyze the challenges it had and the findings of assessing it before the next model completely pivots to writing checks. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-377.pdf
At the time of the GAO audit of USAID’s government to government program, Usaid had given over $620 million directly to governments who met financial and anti corruption criteria. The GAO found that risk assessments of these bilateral financial arrangements needed to be strengthened. Much more is available here in the report, but at the least it should be acknowledged that Usaid was doing bilateral assistance, it was trying to do it with criteria and we should analyze the challenges it had and the findings of assessing it before the next model completely pivots to writing checks. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-377.pdf
At the time of the GAO audit of USAID’s government to government program, Usaid had given over $620 million directly to governments who met financial and anti corruption criteria. The GAO found that risk assessments of these bilateral financial arrangements needed to be strengthened. Much more is available here in the report, but at the least it should be acknowledged that Usaid was doing bilateral assistance, it was trying to do it with criteria and we should analyze the challenges it had and the findings of assessing it before the next model completely pivots to writing checks. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-377.pdf
Thoughtful. I’m glad to have access to this as it really pulls together so much of the complexity.
When foreign assistance returns, should it be more like MCC, given MCC is about a country doing well to qualify for assistance instead of placing money where we saw problems? I understand that a smaller MCC still exists; perhaps this is the springboard for future growth in a form like you propose.
MCC is good model but having spent some time on the inside, it's not the panacea. And I also learned that it is a blunt tool for policy reform and ultimately local political considerations trump the carrot of a compact. At least it was that way in Tanzania for the second compact.
I think foreign assistance also lost favor with the American public. While humanitarian assistance is easily understood and supported alot of the rest was easily categorized as waste if not fraud and abuse.
Our political landscape has also vastly changed since JFK days !
Thank you for writing this! I learned a lot about trends in US aid from it that I wouldn’t have known otherwise.
That being said, I’m hesitant to accept your core argument. You write:
“[I]n 2023 . . . government-to-government assistance had come to represent only a small fraction of total U.S. assistance to Africa. Don’t misunderstand me . . . the number of lives saved from U.S. foreign assistance, including humanitarian relief, may range between 2.3 to 5.6 million per year. That being said, I have been interested in a different set of questions. Namely, what was lost by this shift in approach?”
Here’s my issue: Trade-offs exist. For every dollar given to the sort of government capacity building you seem to be advocating here, that’s a dollar that doesn’t go to HIV/AIDS prevention. So I’m not sure that we can say these are “different questions.” I struggle to see how an argument for less aid dependency can avoid being an argument for less HIV/AIDS prevention and the like.
Of course, one could argue that the local government could implement the HIV/AIDS prevention instead. But then we have to start thinking about things like: How many lives lost to AIDS is a stronger state government worth? I’m open to the idea that there is a point at which a stronger government is worth a few lives, but it’s going to be a hard sell.
Baked into my reasoning is the assumption that the US isn’t implementing these programs through local governments because doing so would be less effective. If that assumption is wrong, then I imagine we wouldn’t need to reach questions of aid dependency, because they align with questions of program effectiveness.
Very revealing. Thanks for the candour and insight. Great to see the perspectives of African leaders, as well as US.
Thought-provoking post, Judd. From a European perspective, you are half right. Aid policy has moved in cycles. There was a 15-year cycle (2000-2015) during which UK and European aid was deliberately channelled through African governments as budget support with as little conditionality on how it was used except at the macro-level on both governance and economic policy. It supported states; it provided leverage; it delivered results. But it did not last. Why that was so deserves a longer article, which is important to answer the question, what aid, if any, is still needed.
Really helpful context. Thanks!
Terrific review, Judd. I see the same loss of focus and direction over the same period in the Pacific.
Really thoughtful piece. Thanks Judd
As someone who has worked for USAID for the past 19 years, I found this to be an interesting and thoughtful piece. However, I was struck by the absence of any reference to the role Congress played in the shift of foreign assistance. Almost 98% of USAID's budget was earmarked by Congress, which meant that even when the Administration directives and/or realities on the ground did not match the programming/funding, there was little the Agency could do to adjust direction. If you are planning to do another piece, I would strongly encourage you to delve into Congress' role in US foreign assistance.
In all the debate about Trump destroying foreign aid, discussion on "the future of aid" and critiques of status quo ante, Congress and the law is totally absent? If aid was misbegotten, ineffectual, bureaucratic, etc etc most of the blame should lie with Congress and existing law which highly constrained aid agencies and practitioners. Trump, for better or worse, has chosen to completely ignore the law - which is an innovation I wish Democrats and Republicans had grasped long ago to improve (rather than destroy) aid. Apparently the Supreme Court doesn't care at all, so this was available to us all along.
At the time of the GAO audit of USAID’s government to government program, Usaid had given over $620 million directly to governments who met financial and anti corruption criteria. The GAO found that risk assessments of these bilateral financial arrangements needed to be strengthened. Much more is available here in the report, but at the least it should be acknowledged that Usaid was doing bilateral assistance, it was trying to do it with criteria and we should analyze the challenges it had and the findings of assessing it before the next model completely pivots to writing checks. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-377.pdf
Nicole: the report says that between 2010 and 2014, G2G funding declined from about $929 million to $327 million.
Of the $327 million, 76 percent went to Pakistan and Afghanistan. That's a small pittance for the rest of the world, and I suspect just a fraction for Africa.
Great review, Judd! I see this was published a day before Doge alum-now State Department appointee Jeremy Lewin's New York Times interview on foreign aid. He talked about the current administration's vision for foreign assistance and specifically highlighted more government-to-government engagement, as you described. It reinforces (for me at least) that facts, patterns and common sense ideas still exist outside of the extreme division that permeates today's political discourse in the U.S, thankfully....looking forward to reading more!
At the time of the GAO audit of USAID’s government to government program, Usaid had given over $620 million directly to governments who met financial and anti corruption criteria. The GAO found that risk assessments of these bilateral financial arrangements needed to be strengthened. Much more is available here in the report, but at the least it should be acknowledged that Usaid was doing bilateral assistance, it was trying to do it with criteria and we should analyze the challenges it had and the findings of assessing it before the next model completely pivots to writing checks. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-377.pdf
At the time of the GAO audit of USAID’s government to government program, Usaid had given over $620 million directly to governments who met financial and anti corruption criteria. The GAO found that risk assessments of these bilateral financial arrangements needed to be strengthened. Much more is available here in the report, but at the least it should be acknowledged that Usaid was doing bilateral assistance, it was trying to do it with criteria and we should analyze the challenges it had and the findings of assessing it before the next model completely pivots to writing checks. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-377.pdf
At the time of the GAO audit of USAID’s government to government program, Usaid had given over $620 million directly to governments who met financial and anti corruption criteria. The GAO found that risk assessments of these bilateral financial arrangements needed to be strengthened. Much more is available here in the report, but at the least it should be acknowledged that Usaid was doing bilateral assistance, it was trying to do it with criteria and we should analyze the challenges it had and the findings of assessing it before the next model completely pivots to writing checks. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-377.pdf
Thoughtful. I’m glad to have access to this as it really pulls together so much of the complexity.
When foreign assistance returns, should it be more like MCC, given MCC is about a country doing well to qualify for assistance instead of placing money where we saw problems? I understand that a smaller MCC still exists; perhaps this is the springboard for future growth in a form like you propose.
I think MCC is one model — especially because the projects are decided in partnership with the recipient government.
MCC is good model but having spent some time on the inside, it's not the panacea. And I also learned that it is a blunt tool for policy reform and ultimately local political considerations trump the carrot of a compact. At least it was that way in Tanzania for the second compact.
I think foreign assistance also lost favor with the American public. While humanitarian assistance is easily understood and supported alot of the rest was easily categorized as waste if not fraud and abuse.
Our political landscape has also vastly changed since JFK days !
Thank you for writing this! I learned a lot about trends in US aid from it that I wouldn’t have known otherwise.
That being said, I’m hesitant to accept your core argument. You write:
“[I]n 2023 . . . government-to-government assistance had come to represent only a small fraction of total U.S. assistance to Africa. Don’t misunderstand me . . . the number of lives saved from U.S. foreign assistance, including humanitarian relief, may range between 2.3 to 5.6 million per year. That being said, I have been interested in a different set of questions. Namely, what was lost by this shift in approach?”
Here’s my issue: Trade-offs exist. For every dollar given to the sort of government capacity building you seem to be advocating here, that’s a dollar that doesn’t go to HIV/AIDS prevention. So I’m not sure that we can say these are “different questions.” I struggle to see how an argument for less aid dependency can avoid being an argument for less HIV/AIDS prevention and the like.
Of course, one could argue that the local government could implement the HIV/AIDS prevention instead. But then we have to start thinking about things like: How many lives lost to AIDS is a stronger state government worth? I’m open to the idea that there is a point at which a stronger government is worth a few lives, but it’s going to be a hard sell.
Baked into my reasoning is the assumption that the US isn’t implementing these programs through local governments because doing so would be less effective. If that assumption is wrong, then I imagine we wouldn’t need to reach questions of aid dependency, because they align with questions of program effectiveness.
Great read. I wonder what your thoughts are on China's more transactional and infrastructure-focused aid model.
I definitely want to tackle it. Worth a full post, right?
Definitely. Looking forward to it.